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Abstract—Covert wireless communication or low probability
of detection (LPD) communication that employs the noise or
jamming signals as the cover to hide user’s information can
prevent a warden Willie from discovering user’s transmission
attempts. Previous work on this problem has typically assumed
that the warden is static and has only one antenna, often
neglecting an active warden who can dynamically adjust his/her
location to make better statistic tests. In this paper, we analyze
the effect of an active warden in covert wireless communications
on AWGN channels and find that, having gathered samples at
different places, the warden can easily detect Alice’s transmission
behavior via a trend test, and the square root law is invalid in this
scenario. Furthermore, a more powerful warden with multiple
antennas is harder to be deceived, and Willie’s detection time
can be greatly shortened.
Index Terms—Physical-layer Security; Covert Wireless Com-
munication; Low Probability of Detection Communication; Ac-
tive Eavesdropper; Trend Test.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional network security methods based on cryptogra-
phy can not solve all security and privacy problems. If a wire-
less node wishes to talk to others without being detected by an
eavesdropper, encryption is not enough [1]. Even a message
is encrypted, the pattern of network traffic can reveal some
sensitive information. If the adversary cannot ascertain Alice’s
transmission behavior, Alice’s communication is unbreakable
even if the adversary has unlimited computing and storage
resources or can mount powerful quantum attacks [2]. On
another occasion, if users hope to protect their source location
privacy [3], they also need to prevent the adversary from
detecting their transmission attempts.
Covert communication, or low probability of detection
(LPD) communication, has a long history. It is always related
with steganography [4] which hides information in cover-
text objects, such as images or software binary code. While
steganography requires some forms of content as cover, the
network covert channel requires some network protocols as its
carrier [5]. Another kind of covert communication is spread
spectrum [6] which is used to protect wireless communication
from jamming and eavesdropping. LPD communication is
also used in the underwater acoustic communication (UWAC)
system for military-related applications [7].
Although spread spectrum for covert communication is
well-developed, its information-theoretic characteristics are
unclear. Recently, another kind of physical-layer covert wire-
less communication that employs noise as the cover to hide
user’s transmissions, is immensely intriguing to researchers.
Consider a wireless communication scenario where Alice
would like to talk to Bob over a wireless channel in order
to not being detected by a warden Willie. Alice can use the
noise in the channel instead of the statistical properties of the
covert-text to hide information. Seminal work of Bash et al.
[8] initiated the research on how the covert throughput scales
with n, the number of channel uses in AWGN channel. It is
shown that using a pre-shared key between Alice and Bob,
it is possible to transmit O(√n) bits reliably and covertly to
Bob over n channel uses such that Willie is not aware of the
existence of communication.
Since covert wireless communication can provide stronger
security protection, significant effort in the last few years has
been devoted to achieve covertness in various network settings.
If Willie has measurement uncertainty about its noise level
due to the existence of SNR wall [9], Alice can achieve an
asymptotic privacy rate which approaches a non-zero constant
[10] [11]. In discrete memoryless channel (DMC), the privacy
rate of covert communication is found to scale like the
square root of the blocklength [12], and closed-form formulas
for the maximum achievable covert communication rate are
derived when the transmitter’s channel-state information (CSI)
is noncausal [13]. To improve the performance of covert
communication, Sober et al. [14] added a friendly “jammer” in
the wireless environment to help Alice for security objectives.
Soltani et al. [15] [16] considered a network scenario where
there are multiple “friendly” nodes that can generate jamming
signals to hide the transmission attempts from multiple ad-
versaries. Liu et al. [17] and He et al. [18] studied the covert
wireless communication with the consideration of interference
uncertainty in a wireless network.
Previous studies on covert wireless communication are all
based on the implicit assumption that the warden Willie is
passive and static, which means that Willie is placed in a
fixed place, judging Alice’s behavior from his observations. An
active Willie is a passive eavesdropper who can dynamically
adjust the distance between him and Alice according to his
samples. After having gathered samples at different places,
Willie detect Alice’s transmission attempts via a trend test.
This triggers a pertinent question: ”How much benefit an active
Willie can gain and how do Alice deal with this situation?”
Answering this question will help us better understand the
benefits and limitations of covert communication in wireless
networks. Besides, a more powerful Willie with multiple
antennas is taken into considerations. We provide insights on
the challenges in covert wireless communications with active
Willie. It is harder for an active Willie to be defeated. Other
secure schemes such as new artificial noise based transmission
schemes, hybrid beamforming techniques need to be developed
to secure wireless transmission [19].
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Covert Throughput and Pre-shared Secret
Bash, Goeckel, and Towsley’s work [8] is the first work that
puts information theoretic bound on covert wireless communi-
cation. A square root law is found over noisy AWGN channels:
Alice can only transmit O(√n) bits reliably and covertly to
Bob over n uses of channels. The reason for the sub-linearly
covert throughput is that Alice can only conceal transmissions
in the standard deviation of the channel noise. However, Bash’s
scheme needs a large pre-shared secret O(√n logn) bits in n
channel uses. In a different model, if Alice transmits only once
in a long sequence of possible transmission slots and Willie
does not know the time of transmission attempts, Alice can
reliably transmit O(min{√n log(T (n)), n}) bits to Bob with
a slotted AWGN channel [20].
To eliminate the need for a long shared secret between Alice
and Bob, Che et al. [21] [22] studied covert communication
over a binary symmetric channel (BSC). There is no pre-shared
secret hidden from Willie. The only asymmetry between Bob
and Willie is that Willie’s channel is worse than Bob’s, and
the best privacy rate Alice can obtain is a constant rate. In a
discrete memoryless multiple-access channel, Arumugam and
Bloch [23] showed that, if the channel to Bob is better than the
one to Willie, Alice can covertly communicate to Bob on the
order of
√
n bits per n channel uses without using a pre-secret.
Another method which can achieve a nonzero privacy rate is
discussed in [10]. Leveraging results on the phenomenon of
SNR wall, Lee et al. found that a nonzero privacy rate is also
possible and the pre-shared secret is not needed. Furthermore,
the recent work of Arrazola et al. [24] demonstrates that the
amount of key consumed in a covert communication protocol
may be smaller than the transmitted key, thus leading to secure
secret key expansion.
B. Channel Models
The first studied channel model is AWGN channel, the
standard model for a free-space RF channel, where the signal
is corrupted by the addition of a sequence of i.i.d. zero-mean
Gaussian random variables. The square root law was found
over AWGN channels [8] and slow fading channels [25]. Yan
et al. [26] first studied delay-intolerant covert communications
in AWGN channels with a finite block length. They found that
n = N is optimal to maximize the amount of information bits
that can be transmitted covertly, where n is the actual number
of channel uses and N is the maximum allowable number of
channel uses.
Recently, covert communication has been extended to var-
ious channel models. In [10], Lee et al. extended their work
from AWGN Rayleigh SISO channel to MIMO channels with
infinite samples when an eavesdropper employs a radiometer
detector and has uncertainty about his noise variance. In
discrete memoryless channels, Wang et al. [12] found that the
privacy rate of covert communication scales like the square
root of the blocklength. Arumugam and Bloch [23] studied
covert communication in a discrete memoryless multiple-
access channel, and extended their work to a K-user mul-
tiple access channel [27] in which K transmitters attempt to
communicate covert messages reliably to a legitimate receiver.
Che et al. [21] [22] first considered covert communication
over a binary symmetric channel. Besides, Bash et al. [28]
studied covert communication in quantum channels, and even
generalized the results with similar throughput scaling. Soltani
et al. [29] studied the covert communications on renewal
packet channels where the packet timings of legitimate users
are governed by a Poisson point process.
C. Codes for Covert Communications
The classical coder for covert communications in AWGN
channel is random coding. Alice takes input in blocks of
size M bits and encodes them into codewords of length n.
She independently generates 2nR codewords and constructs
a codebook which is used as the secret key shared between
Alice and Bob. In practice, Bash [30] proposed to use any
error-correction codes to reliably transmit O(√n) covert bits
using O(√n logn) pre-shared secret bits. However, it is still
challenging to share such a long key in advance. A more
practical method is using a short secret key as the initial key
for a stream-cipher, such as Trivium [31], to generate a long
key.
For covert communications over asynchronous discrete
memoryless channels, Freche et al. [32] [33] proposed a binary
polar code scheme which can achieve good performance close
to the random coding scheme with lower complexity. Bloch
[34] discussed covert communications from a resolvability
perspective, and developed an alternative coding scheme to
achieve the covertness. In [35], Zhang et al. designed com-
putationally efficient codes with provable guarantees on both
reliability and covertness over BSCs which can achieve the
best known throughput.
D. Multi-hop Covert Communication and Shadow Network
Previous work on covert communication mainly focus on
the performance analysis of 1-hop systems, while the per-
formance analysis on multi-hop systems remains largely un-
known.
In [36], Wu et al. considered covert communication in a
two-hop wireless system where Alice communicates with Bob
via a relay. Their results indicate that LPD communication can
be guaranteed if the maximum throughput is limited to O(√n)
bits in n channel uses. In [37], Hu et al. studied the possibility
and achievable performance of covert communication in one-
way relay networks with a greedy relay. In their setting,
the relay is greedy and opportunistically transmits its own
information covertly, while Alice tries to detect this covert
transmission.
Sheikholeslami et al. [38] considered multi-hop covert com-
munication over a moderate size network and in the presence
of multiple collaborating Willies. They developed efficient
algorithms to find optimal paths with maximum throughput
and minimum delay. With the aid of friendly jammers, Soltani
et al. [15] [16] studied a network scenario where there are
multiple “friendly” nodes that can generate artificial noise to
impair wardens’ ability to detect transmissions.
The classical covert wireless communication hides the sig-
nal in the noise. Although the ambient noise is unpredictable
to some extent, the aggregated interference in a wireless
network is more difficult to be predicted. Shabsigh et al.
[39] used stochastic geometry to study the design of Ad-
Hoc covert networks that can hide their transmissions in the
spectrum of primary networks. He et al. [18] studied covert
communication in wireless networks in which Bob and Willie
are subject to uncertain shot noise from interferers. Liu et
al. [17] also considered the covert communication in a noisy
wireless network. Their results show that Alice can reliably
and covertly transmit O(log√n) bits in n channel uses if
the distance between Alice and Willie is larger than a bound
which is only related to n. From the network perspective, the
communications can be hidden in the noisy wireless networks,
and what Willie sees is merely a shadow wireless network.
We would like to point out that all the results discussed
above are based on the implicit assumption that Willie is
passive, static and has only one antenna, while in this paper
we seek to understand whether a more powerful Willie indeed
affects the covert wireless communications and the challenges
Alice will be confronted with.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Channel Model
Consider a wireless communication scene where Alice (A)
wishes to transmit messages to Bob (B) covertly. A war-
den Willie (W) is eavesdropping over the wireless channel
and trying to find whether or not Alice is transmitting. We
adopt the wireless channel model similar to [8]. Each node,
legitimate node or eavesdropper, is equipped with a single
omnidirectional antenna (Willie with multiple antennas will be
discussed in section VI). All wireless channels are assumed
to suffer from discrete-time AWGN with real-valued symbols,
and the wireless channel is modeled by large-scale fading with
path loss exponent α.
Let the transmit power employed for Alice be P0, and
s(A) be the real-valued symbol Alice transmitted which is a
Gaussian random variable N (0, 1) by employing a Gaussian
codebook. Suppose z(B) ∼ N (0, σ2B,0) is the AWGN at Bob,
and z(W ) is the AWGN at Willie with z(W ) ∼ N (0, σ2W,0).
Assume Bob and Willie experience the noise with the same
power, i.e., σ2B,0 = σ
2
W,0 = σ
2
0 . Then, the signal seen by Bob
and Willie when Alice is transmitting can be represented as
follows,
y(B) ≡
√
P0
dαA,B
· s(A) + z(B) ∼ N (0, σ2B) (1)
y(W ) ≡
√
P0
dαA,W
· s(A) + z(W ) ∼ N (0, σ2W ) (2)
and
σ2B =
P0
dαA,B
+ σ20 , σ
2
W =
P0
dαA,W
+ σ20 (3)
where dA,B and dA,W are the Euclidean distances between
Alice and Bob, Alice and Willie, respectively.
B. Covert Communication
To transmit a message to Bob covertly and reliably, Alice
can use the classical encoder in [8] and suppose that Alice and
Bob have a shared secret of sufficient length, based on which
Alice selects a codebook from an ensemble of codebooks. As
to Willie, without knowing the secret key, he cannot decide
with arbitrarily low probability of detection error that whether
his observation is a signal transmitted by Alice or the noise
of the channel.
The codebook Alice chooses is low power codebook, and
any error-correction code can be used to construct a covert
communication system [30]. In this paper, we assume that
Alice and Bob randomly select the symbol periods that they
will use for their transmission by flipping a biased coin n
times, with probability of heads r = O( 1√
n
). On average,
η = O(√n) symbol periods is selected. Bob simply ignores
the discarded symbol periods, however, Willie cannot do so
and thus observes mostly noise. Furthermore, Alice randomly
generate an η-symbol vector k secretly from Willie, and XOR
the encoded message (η symbols) with this secret vector k.
Then Alice transmits on η symbol periods selected. XORing
by vector k prevents Willie’s exploitation of the error correc-
tion code’s structure to detect Alice (rather than protects the
message content).
C. Active Willie
In [8] and [16], Willie is assumed to be passive and static,
which means that Willie is placed in a fixed place, eavesdrop-
ping and judging Alice’s behavior from his n channel samples
y
(W )
1 , y
(W )
2 , · · · , y(W )n with each sample y(W )i ∼ N (0, σ2W ).
Based on the sampling values, Willie employs a radiometer as
his detector, and decides whether Alice is transmitting or not.
The system framework with an active Willie is depicted in
Fig. 1. Willie detects Alice’s behavior at 2t different locations
(each location is d meters apart). At each location he gathers
m samples. For example, at t-th location (with the distance dt
between Alice and Willie), Willie’s samples can be presented
as a vector
yt = (y
(W )
t,1 , y
(W )
t,2 , · · · , y(W )t,m ) (4)
where each sample y
(W )
t,m ∼ N (0, σ2Wt), and σ2Wt = Pt+σ20 =
P0
dtα
+ σ20 .
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Fig. 1. Covert wireless communication in the presence of an active Willie
who leverages a trend analysis to detect Alice’s transmission attempts.
The average sampling value at t-th location can be calcu-
lated as follows
T (yt) =
1
m
yt
Hyt =
1
m
m∑
k=1
y
(W )
t,k ∗ y(W )t,k . (5)
Therefore Willie will have a sampling value vector T, con-
sisting of 2t values at different locations,
T = (T (y1), T (y2), · · · , T (y2t)) (6)
Then Willie decides whether T has a downward trend or not.
If the trend analysis shows a downward trend for given signif-
icance level β, Willie can ascertain that Alice is transmitting
with probability 1− β.
D. Hypothesis Testing
To find whether Alice is transmitting or not, Willie has to
distinguish between the following two hypotheses,
H0 : there is not any trend in vector T; (7)
y(W ) ≡ z(W )
H1 : there is a downward trend in vector T. (8)
y(W ) ≡
√
P0
dαA,W
· s(A) + z(W )
Given the sampling value vector T, Willie can leverage the
Cox-Stuart test [40] to detect the presence of trend. The idea of
the Cox-Stuart test is based on the comparison of the first and
the second half of the samples. If there is a downward trend,
the observations in the second half of the samples should be
smaller than in the first half. If there is not any trend, Willie
should expect only small differences between the first and the
second half of the samples due to randomness. The differences
of samples can be calculated as follows
∆1 = T (y1)− T (yt+1)
∆2 = T (y2)− T (yt+2)
· · · · · ·
∆t = T (yt)− T (y2t)
Let sgn(∆i) = 1 for ∆i < 0, sgn(∆i) = 0 for ∆i ≥ 0. The
test statistic of the Cox-Stuart test on the vector T is
T∆<0 =
t∑
i=1
sgn(∆i) (9)
Given a significance level β and the binomial distribution
b ∼ b(t, 0.5), Willie rejects the null hypothesis H0 and
accepts the alternative hypothesis H1 if T∆<0 < b(β) which
means a downward trend is found with probability larger than
1− β, where b(β) is the quantile of the binomial distribution
b. According to the central limit theorem, if t is large enough
(t > 20), an approximation b(β) = 1/2[t+
√
t ·Φ−1(β)] can
be applied, where Φ−1(β) is the β-quantile function of the
standard normal distribution. Therefore, if
T∆<0 <
1
2
[t+
√
t · Φ−1(β)] (10)
Willie can ascertain that Alice is transmitting with probability
larger than 1 − β for the significance level β of test. Fig. 2
shows examples of the sampling values at different locations
when Alice is transmitting. The downward trend of the signal
power is obvious when Alice is transmitting with certain
transmission probability.
The parameters and notation used in this paper are illus-
trated in Table I.
IV. ACTIVE WILLIE ATTACK
This section discusses the covert wireless communication
in the presence of an active Willie. As illustrated in Fig. 1,
Willie detects Alice’s behavior at 2t different locations. At
each location he gathers m samples and then calculates the
sampling value at this location. At i-th location (with the
distance di between Alice and Willie), Willie’s samples are
a vector
yi = (y
(W )
i,1 , y
(W )
i,2 , · · · , y(W )i,m ) (11)
with
y
(W )
i,m =
{
N (0, σ20) X = 0
N (0, σ2Wi) X = 1
(12)
where X is a random variable, X = 1 if Alice is transmitting
in the current symbol period, X = 0 if Alice is silent, and the
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Fig. 2. The sampling values at different locations when Alice is transmitting
with the transmission probability r = 0.5. Here a bounded path loss law is
used, l(x) = 1
1+‖x‖α
. The transmission power P0 of Alice is 30dB, links
experience unit mean Rayleigh fading, and α = 3. The spacing between
sampling locations d = 0.2m.
TABLE I
PARAMETERS AND NOTATION
Symbol Meaning
P0 Transmission power of Alice
t
Number of differences in Cox-Stuart test
with 2t sampling values.
r Alice’s transmit probability
α Path loss exponent
m Number of samples in a sampling location
Pi Willie’s received power at i-th sampling location
di Distance between Alice and Willie’s i-th location
d Spacing between sampling points
s(A) Alice’s signal
y(B) , y(W ) Signals Bob and Willie observe
z(B), z(W ) (Bob’s, Willie’s) background noise
yt Willie’s samples at t-th location
T (yt) Willies’s sampling value at t-th location
T Willie’s sampling value vector
λ Density of the network
N (µ, σ2) Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance σ2
T∆<0 Test statistic of the Cox-Stuart test
β Significance level of testing
E[X] Mean of random variable X
Var[X] Variance of random variable X
cov[X, Y ] Covariance of random variable X and Y
Φ−1(β) β-quantile function of N (0, 1)
Ii Interference signal at i-th sampling location
σ2Ii
Power of interference signal at i-th sampling location
ρIi,Ij Correlation of interference signals Ii and Ij
ρσ2
Ii
,σ2
Ij
Correlation of σ2Ii
and σ2Ij
transmission probability P{X = 1} = r. σ2Wi = Pi + σ20 =
P0
diα
+ σ20 .
Then the sampling value at this location is
T (yi) =
1
m
yi
Hyi =
1
m
m∑
k=1
[y
(W )
i,k ]
2 (13)
and
[y
(W )
i,k ]
2 =
{
σ20χ
2(1) X = 0
σ2Wiχ
2(1) X = 1
(14)
where χ2(1) is the chi-squared distribution with 1 degree of
freedom.
In this paper, we focus on the circumstance of n → ∞,
which allows Willie to observe a large number of sam-
ples at each location, i.e., m is large enough. Because
{[y(W )i,1 ]2, [y(W )i,2 ]2, · · · , [y(W )i,m ]2} is a sequence of independent
random variables, and satisfies Lindeberg’s condition (the
proof is placed in Appendix A), based on the Lindeberg central
limit theorem, we have
m∑
k=1
[y
(W )
i,k ]
2 ∼ N
( m∑
k=1
E[[y
(W )
i,k ]
2],
m∑
k=1
Var[[y
(W )
i,k ]
2]
)
(15)
with
µi = E[[y
(W )
i,k ]
2] = rσ2Wi + (1− r)σ20 (16)
σ2i = Var[[y
(W )
i,k ]
2] = 3[rσ4Wi + (1− r)σ40 ] (17)
−[rσ2Wi + (1− r)σ20 ]2
Then the sampling value at this location is
T (yi) =
1
m
m∑
k=1
[y
(W )
i,k ]
2 ∼ N
(
µi,
σ2i
m
)
(18)
As to Willie, his received signal strength at i-th location is
Pi = P0d
−α
i = P0(i · d)−α which is a decreasing function of
the distance di. At first Willie monitors the environment, if
he detects the anomaly with Pi ≥ σ20 , Willie then approaches
Alice to carry out more stringent testing. According to the
setting, we have
P1 > P2 > · · · > P2t−1 > P2t = σ20 (19)
With 2t sampling values T (yt) at different locations, Willie
can decide whether (T (y1), T (y2), · · · , T (y2t)) has a down-
ward trend or not via the Cox-Stuart test. The differences
satisfy the following distribution
∆i = T (yi)− T (yt+i) ∼ N (µ∆i , σ2∆i) (20)
where
µ∆i = µi − µt+i = σ20A(i, t, r, α) (21)
σ2∆i =
σ2i + σ
2
t+i
m
=
σ40
m
B(i, t, r, α) (22)
and
A(i, t, r, α) = r
[(
2t
i
)α
−
(
2t
t+ i
)α]
(23)
B(i, t, r, α) = 3
[
r
((
2t
i
)α
+ 1
)2
+ (1− r)
]
−
−
[
r
(
2t
i
)α
+ 1
]2
+3
[
r
((
2t
t+ i
)α
+ 1
)2
+ (1− r)
]
−
−
[
r
(
2t
t+ i
)α
+ 1
]2
(24)
The probability that the difference∆i = T (yi)−T (yt+i) <
0 (1 ≤ i ≤ t) can be estimated as follows,
P{∆i < 0} = P{T (yi) < T (yt+i)} = Φ
(
−µ∆i
σ∆i
)
(25)
However, the number of negative differences in
∆1,∆2, ...,∆t is t Poisson trials where the success
probabilities P{∆i < 0} (i = 1, 2, · · · , t) differ among
the trials, it has no standard distribution. We find that
µ∆i
σ∆i
decreases with i. Therefore the number of negative differences
in ∆1,∆2, ...,∆t can be upper bounded as follows
T∆<0 =
t∑
i=1
P{∆i < 0} ≤ tP{∆t < 0} = tΦ
(
−µ∆t
σ∆t
)
(26)
and
µ∆t
σ∆t
=
√
m · κ(r, α) (27)
where
κ(r, α) ≈ 2
α − 1
2
· r (28)
when r is small enough.
If t is large enough (t > 20), the following inequality holds
T∆<0 ≤ tΦ(−
√
m · κ(r, α)) < 1
2
[t+
√
t · Φ−1(β)]. (29)
Therefore, given any small significance level β > 0, if the
number of locations t satisfies
t >
[
Φ−1(β)
1− 2Φ(−√m · κ(r, α))
]2
, (30)
Willie can distinguish between two hypotheses H0 and H1
with probability 1− β.
According to Equ. (29), Willie with certain m and t can
detect Alice’s transmission if the transmission probability of
Alice r is larger than the threshold as follows
r ≥ rmax = 2
2α − 1 ·
1√
m
·Φ−1
[
1− 1
2
(
1+
Φ−1(β)√
t
)]
(31)
This may be a pessimistic result since it demonstrates that
for given certain m (or t) and r, Willie can find certain t
(or m) to detect Alice’s transmission behavior. If Alice uses
the channel a finite number of times, n, and Willie samples
the channel m ∗ t = n times, Alice can only transmit O(n ∗
rmax) bits covertly. Fig.3 shows the number of bits that can
be transmitted covertly versus the number of channel uses,
n, with different system configurations. We can observe that
the number of covert bits increases with channel uses and is
much less than the square root law. We also observe that for
fixed values of n and t, by increasing the parameter β, the
number of covert bits will be decreased and the effect of t on
the number of covert bits for given β is very small.
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Fig. 3. Number of bits that can be transmitted covertly. Here n = t ∗m and
α = 4.
A. Willie’s detection strategy
As discussed above, given certain sampling locations t
and the number of samples m at each location, Willie can
ascertained with significant high probability that Alice is trans-
mitting or not. However, if Willie chooses large m and t to
detect Alice’s transmission behavior when Alice’s transmission
probability r is small, the sample collection procedure will
last long time. Furthermore, without any knowledge of Alice,
Willie does not know how to select the optimal parameter m
and t. Small parameters will make Willie missing detection
when Alice’s transmission probability is very small, large
parameters, however, will make the detection time unaccepted.
Detection Strategy: To make detection efficiently and
quickly, Willie divides the detection procedure into multiple
rounds. At each round, Willie samples the channel at each
detection location with a small m. At the end of each round,
Willie tests Alice’s behavior with the samples gathered in this
round and all other rounds before. If a downward tendency
is found in the sampling values, Willie declares that Alice is
transmitting. Otherwise, Willie carries out the next round of
sampling and testing until a conspicuous behavior is found.
In this way, Willie can quickly find Alice’s transmission
when the transmission probability is not small. In the case
that Alice intends to transmit a short message, if Willie does
not adopt the round based detection strategy and chooses a
large parameter m, it will take Willie a very long time to
find this transmission. What is worse, the successful detec-
tion probability will decrease since more noise is involved
into the sampling values. In practice, because Willie has no
information about Alice, it is necessary to set a maximum
round value, roundmax. If Willie does not find any suspicious
behavior of Alice through roundmax rounds of inspection, he
then restarts the detection from scratch. The roundmax should
be set properly, smaller value will lead to miss detection of
Alice’s transmission with very small transmission probability,
larger value on the other hand will involve in more channel
noise if Alice’s transmission message is very short.
B. Successful Detection Probability
Next we estimate the successful detection probability of
Willie. Suppose Willie samples Alice’s transmission signal at
2t locations, each withm samples at a round.With 2t sampling
values T (yt) at different locations, Willie then try to decide
whether (T (y1), T (y2), · · · , T (y2t)) has a downward trend
or not via the Cox-Stuart test. He calculates the differences
∆i = T (yi)−T (yt+i) (i = 1..t), and constructs a test statistic
T∆<0 =
∑t
i=1 sgn(∆i) (where sgn(∆i) = 1 for ∆i < 0,
sgn(∆i) = 0 for ∆i ≥ 0). Given a significance level β and
the binomial distribution b ∼ b(t, 0.5), he rejects the null
hypothesis H0 and accept the alternative hypothesis H1 if
T∆<0 < b(β).
According to Equ. (25), we have
P{∆i < 0} = Φ
(
−µ∆i
σ∆i
)
(32)
and
P{∆1 < 0} < · · · < P{∆t < 0} (33)
Becasue T∆<0 is the sum of t Poisson trials with different
success probabilities. Let µ = E(T∆<0) denote the sum’s
expected value. According to multiplicative Chernoff bound,
for any δ > 0,
P{T∆<0 < (1 + δ)µ} ≥ 1−
[
eδ
(1 + δ)(1+δ)
]µ
(34)
For given significance β, let b(β) = (1 + δ)µ, then
the probability that Willie can detect Alice’s transmission
behavior, Psucc, can be lower bounded as follows
Psucc = P{T∆<0 < b(β)}
≥ 1−
[
eδ
(1 + δ)(1+δ)
]µ
(35)
for any δ = b(β)/µ − 1 > 0, where b(β) = 1/2[t + √t ·
Φ−1(β)], and
µ =
t∑
i=1
P{∆i < 0} =
t∑
i=1
Φ
(
−µ∆i
σ∆i
)
(36)
where µ∆i and σ∆i are defined in (21) and (22), and
µ∆i
σ∆i
=
A(i, t, r, α)
√
m√
B(i, t, r, α)
√
R (37)
Here A(i, t, r, α) and B(i, t, r, α) are defined in (23) and (24),
and R represents the number of rounds, m is the number of
samples per round at a location.
Fig. 4 shows the successful detection probability versus
rounds of detection for different parameters. What can be
clearly seen in the figures is the rapid increase in the successful
detection probability when more detection rounds are taken.
For given transmission probability of Alice, Fig. 4(a) illustrates
that more detection locations or more samples at each location
will have higher detection probability. If Alice decreases her
transmission probability, her transmission behavior is harder
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Fig. 4. The successful detection probability of Willie versus rounds of
detection for (a) different parameters m and t when r = 0.001, and (b)
different transmission probability r. Here α = 4 and β = 0.01.
to be found, since Willie’s successful detection probability
decreases rapidly with r, as depicted in Fig. 4(b).
However, no matter how low Alice’s transmission probabil-
ity is, Willie can ascertain Alice’s transmitting attempt with
probability 1−β for any small β and certain number of rounds.
This may be a pessimistic result since it demonstrates that
Alice cannot resist the attack of active Willie and the square
root law does not hold in this situation.
V. COUNTERMEASURES TO ACTIVE WILLIE
If Alice has knowledge about Willie, such as Willie’s
location, she can decrease her transmission power when Willie
is approaching. However, Alice may be a small and simple
IoT device who is not able to perceive the environmental
information.
In practice, to confuse Willie, Alice should decrease her
transmission power. Clearly, when Alice’s transmission power
p0 decreases, Willie’s uncertainty increases. However, if Willie
can move close to Alice, the downward tendency of the
signal power is still exist, although this tendency becomes
weakening. Fig.5(a) depicts this tendency of the sampling
values at different locations. Another intuitive countermeasure
is to further confuse Willie with the aid of a friendly jammer,
as discussed in [14]. Although a jammer can help Alice for
security objectives by artificially increasing the noise level of
Willie, it cannot change the tendency of the sampling values.
As illustrated in Fig.5, if a jammer and Alice do not coordi-
nate and the jammer randomly changes his/her power of the
Gaussian noise in each slot of signals, the magnitude of signal
fluctuation increases. However, there is still a downtrend, even
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Fig. 5. The sampling values at different locations with the transmit probability
r = 0.02, and d = 10m. The path loss model is l(x) = 1
1+‖x‖α
with
α = 4. (a) No jammer and no Rayleigh fading in channels are taken into
considerations. The transmit power of Alice is P0 = 30dB, the number of
samples at each location per round ism = 50, the noise power is σ20 = 10dB,
the sampling values are computed through R = 20 rounds of detection. (b) A
friendly jammer is introduced into the network to emit interference signal to
help Alice, no Rayleigh fading in channel is considered. The jammer moves
with Willie and keeps the distance between him and Willie dj , w = 1m, his
jamming signal power is set to Pj = 30dB. (c) A friendly jammer and the
unit mean Rayleigh fading are taken into considerations. Alice uses different
transmit power to communicate with Bob. Red line represents P0 = 33dB,
the dotted blue line denotes P0 = 30dB. (d) A friendly jammer and the unit
mean Rayleigh fading are taken into considerations. Different noise power
levels are compared. Red line represents the noise power σ20 = 20dB, the
dotted blue line denotes σ20 = 10dB. (e) The sampling values at different
locations when m = 50 and R = 20; (f) The sampling values at different
locations when m = 100 and R = 20.
in a fading channel. If Willie can collect more samples at each
location, he can obtain a smoother sampling values.
A. Interference of Static Network
For a static and passive Willie, to discriminate the actual
transmitter from the other in a network is a difficult task,
provided that there is no obvious radio fingerprinting of
transmitters can be exploited [41]. For the reasons discussed
above, Alice cannot defeat the attack of an active Willie, even
an uninformed jammer is introduced in the environment. Next
we investigate the covert performance if Alice is put into a
dense static wireless network.
Given a static wireless network deployment as depicted
in Fig.6(a), wireless nodes are deployed in a grid network
with 5 meters apart. Each node transmits signal randomly
and independently with the same transmit power. As shown
in Fig.6(b), with the increase of jamming probability rj ,
Willie’s successful detection probability decreases. This makes
sense because Willie will receive more interference if the
surrounding nodes transmits with higher probability. However,
as more rounds of detection are taken, Willie’s successful
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(a) Static wireless network topology for simulation.
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Fig. 6. (a) The static wireless network is deployed in a 400 × 400m2
space; (b) The probability of Willie’s successful detection versus the number
of detection rounds for different jamming probability. Here the results are
averaged over 500 experiments, and at each round, parameters m = 50,
r = 0.02, α = 4 and β = 0.05, d = 4m, t = 30, σ2 = 10dB,
p0 = pj = 30dB.
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Fig. 7. Mobile network topology for simulation.
detection probability increases, implying that the interference
in a static network is not enough to hide Alice’s transmission
behavior.
B. Interference of Mobile Network
The above discussion shows that the interference in a
static network cannot completely confuse Willie. Willie could
approach Alice as close as possible, and ensure that there is no
other node located closer to Alice than him. Next we put an
active Willie in a mobile network to test whether or not Willie
will be bewildered by the interference from a large number of
mobile nodes.
We consider a mobile network with 800 nodes deployed
in a 400 × 400m2 space. As depicted in Fig.7, Alice is
placed in the center of this region, Willie is dmax meters
away from Alice. However Willie cannot get too close to
Alice, dmin is the minimum distance between them. In a
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Fig. 8. The successful detection probability of Willie versus the number of
rounds of detection for different jamming probability rj . Here the results are
averaged over 200 experiments, and at each round, parameters t = 30, m =
50, and r = 0.01. The distance between Alice and Willie is dmin = 0.5m
and dmax = 4m, Alice’s transmit power and the jamming power of each
mobile node is p0 = pj = 30dB.
wireless network, some wireless nodes are probably placed
on towers, trees, or buildings, Willie cannot get close enough
as he wishes. Each mobile node transmits signal randomly
and independently with the jamming probability rj . For the
movement of nodes, we adopt the Random Walk Mobility
Model [42] used for simulation of mobile ad-hoc network.
The Random Walk Mobility Model mimics the unpredictable
movements of many objects in nature. In our simulation,
mobile nodes are randomly deployed in the area. Each node
randomly selects a direction and move at a random speed
uniformly selected from [0, 6]m/s. The new direction and
speed are randomly selected every second.
Fig.8 shows Willie’s successful detection probability versus
the rounds of detection for different jamming probability rj .
As more detection rounds are taken, Willie’s successful de-
tection probability increases as well. The higher the jamming
probability rj mobile nodes adopt, the lower the detection
probability since more interference is involved in the sampling
values.
Fig.9(a) and Fig.9(b) show the successful probability for
different dmax and dmin. In Fig.9(a), we fix |dmax −
dmin| = 5m and increase dmin from 0m to 5m. The
results show that the successful probability decreases rapidly
along with dmin which is reasonable due to the larger dmin
implying that Willie is far away from Alice. In Fig.9(b),
dmin is fixed but dmax grows. As illustrated in this figure,
the successful probability increases with the dmax at first,
then decreases. When dmax ∈ (2, 3)m (dmin = 0.5m), the
probability reaches its maximal value. Thus, there is a tradeoff
between the security level and the value dmax which means
that Willie should approach Alice as close as possible and
sets his sampling locations in a proper distance, not setting
dmax−dmin too great, nor too small. Also, more samples at a
location (larger m) will result in higher successful probability,
but the benefits are trivial compared with other parameters.
C. Informed Jammer
The previous discussion shows that, Alice cannot hide her
transmission behavior in the presence of an active Willie, even
if she can utilize other transmitters (or jammers) to increase
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Fig. 9. The successful detection probability of Willie versus dmin and dmax
for different m. Here the results are averaged over 200 experiments, and at
each round, parameters r = rj = 0.01, α = 4 and β = 0.05. (a) The
minimum distance dmin increases, and dmax = dmin + 5m; (b) The
minimum dmin is set to be 0.5m, dmax grows.
the interference level of Willie, such as the methods used in
[14] [15] [16] [17]. These methods can only raise the noise
level but not change the trend of the sampling values.
The countermeasures discussed above assume that the
friendly jammers or interferers in a network are uninformed
which means the jammers are not coordinate with Alice. If
the jammer has complete knowledge about Alice and Willie,
he can closely coordinate with Alice. At the time Alice starts
to transmit a codeword, the jammer transmits Gaussian noise
simultaneously with the transmit power which is determined
according to the distance between him and Alice da,j , the
distance between him and Willie dw,j , and Alice’s transmit
power to let Willie’s sampling values unchanged when Willie
moves along different locations. Willie is then unable to
determine that any change has taken place whether Alice is
transmitting or silent.
However, as the jammer changes his power to make Willie’s
sampling value remain the same value whenever Alice is
transmitting or not, another eavesdropper can find the change
pattern of the jammer’s power and then deduce Alice’s behav-
ior. Furthermore, this countermeasure is difficult to implement
since it is harder to realize the precision synchronizing control
between Alice and the jammer.
VI. WILLIE WITH MULTIPLE ANTENNAS
As discussed above, those countermeasures cannot confused
Willie effectively. However, it is very difficult for Willie to find
Alice’s transmission quickly, since Willie has no information
about Alice’s codebook, he needs to sample at many different
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Fig. 10. Willie with Multiple Antennas.
locations, especially when Alice’s transmission probability is
very small. Next we extend our results to a more powerful
Willie who has multiple antennas.
Different from the framework depicted in Fig. 1, Willie
arranges multiple antennas at 2t different locations to detects
Alice’s behavior. As shown in Fig.10, those antennas syn-
chronously sample the channel, and Willie uses these samples
at different antennas to judge Alice’s transmission behavior.
Before diving into details on multiple antennas Willie, the
network model and Willie’s detection method are in order, as
well as discussion of Willie’s detection probability.
A. Network Model
Suppose Alice, Bob, and Willie are placed in a large-scale
wireless network, where the locations of transmitters form a
stationary Poisson point process (PPP) [43] Π = {Xi} on
the plane R2. The density of the PPP is represented by λ.
Suppose the transmission decisions are made independently
across transmitters and independent of their locations for each
transmitter, and the transmit power employed for each node
are a constant P0. The wireless channel is modeled by large-
scale fading with path loss exponent α. For simplicity, let the
channel gain hi,j of channel between i and j is static over the
signaling period, and all links experience unit mean Rayleigh
fading. Then, the aggregated interference seen by node i is the
functional of the underlying PPP and the channel gain,
Ii ≡
∑
k∈Π
√
Pt
dαi,k
hi,k · sk ∼ N (0, σ2Ii ) (38)
where each sk is a Gaussian random variable N (0, 1) which
represents the signal of the k-th transmitter, and
σ2Ii =
∑
k∈Π
Pt
dαi,k
|hi,k|2 (39)
are shot noise (SN) process, representing the powers of the
interference that Bob and Willie experience, respectively. The
Rayleigh fading assumption implies |hi,j |2 is exponentially
distributed with unit mean.
The powers of aggregated interference, σ2Ii , is RV which
is determined by the randomness of the underlying PPP of
transmitters and the fading of wireless channels. The closed-
form distribution of the interference is hard to obtain, and its
mean is not exist if we employ the unbounded path loss law.
We then use a modified path loss law to estimate the mean of
σ2Ii ,
l(r) ≡ r−α1r≥η, r ∈ R+, for η ≥ 0. (40)
This law truncates around the origin and thus removes the
singularity of impulse response function l(r) ≡ r−α. Although
transmitters no longer form a PPP under this bounded path loss
law (a hard-core point process in this case), this model yields
rather accurate results for relatively small guard zones. For
η > 0, the mean and variance of σ2Ii are finite and can be
given as [44]
E[σ2Ii ] =
λdcd
α− dE[|h|
2]E[Pt]η
d−α (41)
Var[σ2Ii ] =
λdcd
2α− dE[|h|
4]E[P 2t ]η
d−2α (42)
where d is the spatial dimension of the network, the relevant
values of cd are: c1 = 2, c2 = π, c3 = 4π/3.
When d = 2, α = 4, constant transmit power Pt, and the
fading |h|2 ∼ Exp(1), we have
E[σ2Ii ] = πλη
−2 · Pt (43)
which will be used to estimate the interference Willie experi-
ences later.
B. Willie’s detection strategy
Suppose the network is interference limited, i.e., the thermal
noise is negligible compared to the aggregated interference
from other transmitters. At i-th antenna (with the distance di
between Alice and this antenna) and (t+i)-th antenna, Willie’s
samples are
yi =
√
P0
dαi
· s+ Ii ∼ N
(
0,
P0
dαi
+ σ2Ii
)
(44)
yt+i =
√
P0
dαt+i
· s+ It+i ∼ N
(
0,
P0
dαt+i
+ σ2It+i
)
(45)
where P0 is the transmit power of Alice, and Ii, It+i are
the interferences seen by i-th antenna and (t+ i)-th antenna.
Even though the interference distribution is identical on the
entire plane (in the two-dimensional case), the interference Ii
and It+i are not independent across the plane (which will be
discussed later).
With 2t sampling values y = (y21 , y
2
2, · · · , y22t) at different
antennas, Willie then tries to decide whether y has a downward
trend or not via a Cox-Stuart test. He calculates the differences
∆i = y
2
i − y2t+i (i = 1..t), and constructs a test statistic
T∆<0 =
∑t
i=1 sgn(∆i) (where sgn(∆i) = 1 for ∆i < 0,
sgn(∆i) = 0 for ∆i ≥ 0). Given a significance level β and
the binomial distribution b ∼ b(t, 0.5), he rejects the null
hypothesis H0 and accept the alternative hypothesis H1 if
T∆<0 < b(β).
C. Successful Detection Probability
The number of negative differences in ∆1,∆2, ...,∆t is t
Poisson trials where the success probabilities P{∆i < 0} (i =
1, 2, · · · , t) differ among the trials, and the number of negative
differences in ∆1,∆2, ...,∆t can be expressed as follows
T∆<0 =
t∑
i=1
P{∆i < 0} =
t∑
i=1
P{y2i < y2t+i} (46)
To calculate P{y2i < y2t+i}, we first have to obtain the
joint distribution of (yi, yt+i). In the AWGN channels, the
samples at i-th and (t + i)-th antennas, (yi, yt+i), have a
joint normal distribution, since they are linear combination
of the signals from all transmitters in the network, and those
signals are independent normal random variables which have
the multivariate normal distribution. Therefore the pair (yi,
yt+i) have the bivariate normal distribution as follows
(yi, yt+i) ∼ N
(
0, 0,
P0
dαi
+ σ2Ii ,
P0
dαt+i
+ σ2It+i , ρyiyt+i
)
(47)
where ρyiyt+i is the correlation coefficient between yi and
yt+i, and can be calculated as follows
ρyiyt+i =
cov[yi, yt+i]√
Var[yi]
√
Var[yt+i]
=
P0d
−α/2
i d
−α/2
t+i + ρIiIt+iσIiσIt+i√
(P0d
−α
i + σ
2
Ii
)(P0d
−α
t+i + σ
2
It+i
)
(48)
here ρIiIt+i is the correlation coefficient between Ii and It+i.
Given any two points u and v, using the bounded path loss
model l(x) = 11+‖x‖α , we can estimate the spatial correlation
of Iu and Iv , ρIuIv , and the spatial correlation of σ
2
Iu
and
σ2Iv , ρσ2Iuσ
2
Iv
. In Fig.11, the spatial correlations are plotted
as a function of the distance between two points u and v.
Distance decreases the spatial correlation. We observe that,
the decrease of ρIuIv continues at a slower rate than ρσ2Iuσ
2
Iv
,
and ρIuIv > ρσ2Iuσ
2
Iv
. This implies that the interference seen
by u and v are approximately independent when they are far
apart. When they are very close to each other, they experience
almost the same interference.
ρIiIt+i is hard to obtain. However, the correlation coefficient
of σ2u and σ
2
v , u 6= v can be calculated as ( [44], Lemma 3.3),
ρσ2uσ2v =
∫
R2
l(x)l(x− ‖ u− v ‖)dx
E[|h|2] ∫
R2
l2(x)dx
(49)
where l(x) be the impulse response function to model the path
loss attenuation, h be the fading coefficient. Therefore we can
lower bound the correlation between yi and yt+i as follows
ρyiyt+i >
P0d
−α/2
i d
−α/2
t+i + ρσ2Iiσ
2
Ii+t
σIiσIt+i√
(P0d
−α
i + σ
2
Ii
)(P0d
−α
t+i + σ
2
It+i
)
= ρ˜yiyt+i
(50)
Then we have
P{∆i ≤ 0} = P{y2i ≤ y2t+i} (51)
=
∫∫
G:x2<y2
fi(x, y)dxdy (52)
<
∫∫
G:x2<y2
f˜i(x, y)dxdy (53)
where fi(x, y) is the PDF of the bivariate normal variables
(yi, yt+i) following distribution of (47), and f˜i(x, y) is the
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Fig. 11. The spatial correlations ρIiIt+i and ρσ2uσ2v
versus the distance
between u and v. Here the path loss model is l(x) = 1
1+‖x‖α
and the
fading |h|2 ∼ Exp(1).
PDF of (yi, yt+i) with different correlation ρ˜yiyt+i which is
described as follows
(yi, yt+i) ∼ N
(
0, 0,
P0
dαi
+ σ2Ii ,
P0
dαt+i
+ σ2It+i , ρ˜yiyt+i
)
(54)
The unequation in Equ.(53) is due to ρyiyt+i > ρ˜yiyt+i , and
is explained in Appendix B.
Let P{∆˜i ≤ 0} =
∫∫
G:x2<y2
f˜i(x, y)dxdy, then
T∆<0 =
t∑
i=1
P{∆i < 0} <
t∑
i=1
P{∆˜i ≤ 0} = T∆˜<0 (55)
Therefore, we can lower bound the successful detection prob-
ability as follows
P{T∆<0 < b(β)} > P{T∆˜<0 < b(β)}
= P
{
T∆˜<0 − µ
σ
<
b(β) − µ
σ
}
> 1− 1
1 + k2
(56)
where k = b(β)−µσ , µ = E[T∆˜<0] =
∑t
i=1 P{∆˜i ≤ 0},
σ2 = Var[T∆˜<0] =
∑t
i=1 P{∆˜i ≤ 0} · [1 − P{∆˜i ≤ 0}].
Equ. (56) is due to Cantelli’s Inequality which states that for
a random variableX with mean µ and variance σ2, P{X−µ ≥
kσ} ≤ 1/(1 + k2).
With Equ.(43) (with η = 1) as the estimation of the
power of interference σ2Ii , we can derive ρ˜yiyt+i , and obtain
P{∆˜i ≤ 0}, therefore get the lower bound of successful
detection probability.
Fig.12(a),12(b), and 12(c) show the successful detection
probability with different number of antennas and dmin,
dmax. The graph Fig.12(a) clearly shows that more antennas
will result in higher successful detection probability. Although
more dense the network will redult in lower detection proba-
bility, Willie can definitely find Alice’s transmission at once
provided that Willie has enough number of antennas.
In Fig.12(b), we fix dmax = dmin + 4m and increase
dmin from 0m to 3m. The results show that the successful
probability decreases rapidly along with dmin and more
interference from other transmitters (higher λ) will decrease
the the probability. This is reasonable because the larger dmin
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Fig. 12. Willie’s successful detection probability with different density λ
versus (a) the number of antennas with dmin = 0m and dmax = 5m, (b)
dmin with dmax = dmin + 4m, (c) dmax − dmin with dmin is fixed
to be 0.5m. Here α = 4, β = 0.05, and p0 = 30dB.
implies that Willie is far away from Alice. In Fig.12(c),
dmin is fixed but dmax grows. As shown in this figure,
the successful probability increases with the dmax at first,
then decreases. When dmax ∈ (0.5, 1)m (dmin = 0.5m), the
probability reaches its maximal value. Thus, there is a tradeoff
between the security level and the value dmax which means
that Willie should approach Alice as close as possible and sets
his sampling locations in a proper distance.
Therefore, if Willie can deploy multiple antennas and can
get close to Alice, he may find Alice’s transmission attempt
immediately, no need for long sampling. This kind of active
Willie is very different to deal with.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have demonstrated that the active Willie is hard to
be defeated to achieve covertness of communications. Alice
cannot hide her transmission behavior in the presence of an
active Willie, even if she is placed in a noisy network, or a
friendly jammer is involved. A more powerful Willie with mul-
tiple antennas can detect Alice’s transmission behavior rapidly.
Therefore Alice is confronted with enormous challenges if
the active Willie is determined to monitor her behavior. As
to Alice, there is no better countermeasure to deal with the
active Willie in AWSN channels.
As a first step of studying the effects of active Willie
on covert wireless communication, this work considers the
scenario with one active Willie. A natural future work is to
extend the study to multi-Willie. They may work in coor-
dination to enhance their detection ability. Another relative
aspect is how to extend the results to DMC or BSC channels,
and 5G wireless communication network using beamforming
technique and mmWare communication system.
APPENDIX A
LINDEBERG’S CONDITION
Suppose X1, X2, · · · , Xm is a sequence of independent
random variables, among them there are mr (0 ≤ r ≤ 1)
random variables obeying distribution σ2W · χ2(1), the remain
are σ20 · χ2(1) random variables, where σ2W and σ20 are finite
value. Define
s2m =
m∑
i=1
Var[Xi] = mr · 2σ4W +m(1− r) · 2σ40
According to Chebyshev’s Inequality,
P{|Xi − µi| > ǫsm} < Var[Xi]
ǫ2s2m
we have
f(m) =
1
s2m
m∑
i=1
E[(Xi − µi)2 · 1{|Xi−µi|>ǫsm}]
<
1
s2m
[
mr · 4σ
8
W
ǫ2s2m
+m(1− r) · 4σ
8
0
ǫ2s2m
]
=
r · σ8W + (1 − r) · σ80
mǫ2[r · σ4W + (1− r) · σ40 ]2
Therefore for every ǫ > 0,
lim
m→∞
1
s2m
m∑
i=1
E[(Xi − µi)2 · 1{|Xi−µi|>ǫsm}] = 0
which means that Lindeberg’s condition holds, i.e., the distri-
bution of ∑m
i=1Xi −
∑m
i=1E(Xi)√∑m
i=1Var(Xi)
converges towards the standard normal distribution N (0, 1).
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Fig. 13. (a) The probability P{X2 < Y 2} and correlation coefficient
ρX,Y for a bivariate normal distribution. (b) The contour of PDF of
(X, Y ) ∼ N (0.0, 1000, 100, 0.1). (c) The contour of PDF of (X, Y ) ∼
N (0.0, 1000, 100, 0.9).
APPENDIX B
THE PROBABILITY P{X2 < Y 2} AND CORRELATION
COEFFICIENT ρ FOR A BIVARIATE NORMAL DISTRIBUTION
For a bivariate normal distribution with µ1 = µ2 = 0,
(X,Y ) ∼ N (0, 0, σ21 , σ22 , ρ)
if σ21 > σ
2
2 , then the probability P{X2 < Y 2} decreases with
|ρ|; if σ21 < σ22 , P{X2 < Y 2} increases with |ρ|. In the case
σ21 = σ
2
2 , P{X2 < Y 2} = 1/2.
Because the analytical expressions of P{X2 < Y 2} is hard
to obtain, we can verify the above results through numerical
results. The probability P{X2 < Y 2} can be calculated as
follows
P{X2 < Y 2} =
∫∫
G:x2<y2
f(x, y)dxdy
where f(x, y) is the PDF of (X,Y ),
f(x, y) =
1
2πσ1σ2
√
1− ρ2
× exp
{ −1
2(1− ρ2)
[
x2
σ21
− 2ρ x · y
σ1σ2
+
y2
σ22
]}
As depicted in Fig.13(b)(c), when σ21 > σ
2
2 , if ρ increases,
the distribution of (X,Y ) is more focused on the region
G : X2 > Y 2, resulting in less P{X2 < Y 2}. Fig.13(a)
also illustrates this result, e.g., P{X2 < Y 2} decreases with
|ρ| when σ21 > σ22 , and increases with |ρ| when σ21 < σ22 .
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